Research

[preprint | journal]

I show that "weak" variants of positive and negative introspection principles are much stronger than expected and are susceptible to versions of the standard arguments against positive and negative introspection.

[preprint | journal]

I generalise Fitch's Paradox to show that standard diagnoses of it are mistaken and it depends on much weaker assumptions than commonly thought needed.

[preprint | journal | online view]

I extend the reasoning in Fitch's Paradox to show other interesting cases of modal collapse.

See Dissertation.

Standard justifications for the requirement that credences obey the laws of probability focus on its connection to action and truth. I outline a novel justification that's based on the connection between credence and evidence.

I provide an error theory for the violation of Separability on various axiologies, focusing on Averagism.

I defend a semantics for the deontic and epistemic 'ought' based on Bayesian confirmation theory.

I show the incompatibility of the Principal Principle with another prima facie compelling chance-credence principle, and discuss the implications of this.

I explore the logical relations among various principles about mereological fusions and their relations to various principles about parthood.

I provide some characterisations of  sufficiently weak logics not susceptible to Fitch's Paradox.