KK, Knowledge, Knowability (Mind, forthcoming)


I show that "weak" variants of positive and negative introspection principles are much stronger than expected and are susceptible to versions of the standard arguments against positive and negative introspection.

Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles (The Journal of Philosophy, 2020)

[preprint | journal]

I generalise Fitch's Paradox to show that standard diagnoses of it are mistaken and it depends on much weaker assumptions than commonly thought needed.

Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2019)

[preprint | journal | online view]

I extend the reasoning in Fitch's Paradox to show other interesting cases of modal collapse.

Under Review

[Title redacted]

I defend Averagism against standard objections.

[Title redacted]

I defend a semantics for the deontic and epistemic 'ought' based on Bayesian confirmation theory.

[Title redacted]

Standard justifications for the requirement that credences obey the laws of probability focus on its connection to action and truth. I outline a novel justification that's based on the connection between credence and evidence.

Works in Progress

Bayesian Relations

I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when comparative relations of the form "A is at least as likely as B given E" are representable by probability functions, generalising and extending existing results.

Chance, Credence, Correlation

I show the incompatibility of the Principal Principle with another prima facie compelling chance-credence principle, and discuss the implications of this.

Mereology as a Theory of Fusions

I explore the logical relations among various principles about mereological fusions and their relations to various principles about parthood.

Conservative Extension Results for Fitch's Paradox

I provide some characterisations of sufficiently weak logics not susceptible to Fitch's Paradox.